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Well-Being at a Time1 
Ben Bradley 
Syracuse University 
1. Introduction 
Philosophical theories of well-being almost always focus on the 
value of an entire life. There is some reason to be especially focused 
on lives: they are big and inclusive. It would be strange, for in-
stance, to be focused only on what happens to you right now, or in 
the month of February. You’d be imprudent to ignore what hap-
pens at all the other times in your life. Prudence dictates caring 
about all the parts of your life; so it makes sense that prudence 
would focus on whole lives rather than smaller parts. 
But it is a mistake to focus exclusively on whole lives. We should 
also care about welfare levels at particular times and at intervals of 
time smaller than a whole life. Consider, for example, the famous 
question Ronald Reagan asked the American public in October 
1980: “Ask yourself: Are you better off than you were four years 
ago?” This is a question about temporal well-being. If all we have 
is a theory about welfare in a whole life, we cannot answer Reagan’s 
question. 
There are several other reasons we might think it is important 
to know how well-being is distributed throughout a life. The first 
concerns equality. Suppose we have two societies whose citizens 
are identical in lifetime well-being, but in society A well-being levels 
1 Versions of this paper were presented at the 2013 Princeton 
Workshop on Well-Being, the 2013 Paris Workshop on Well-
Being, the 2014 APA Central Division Meeting, the 2014 confer-
ence on hedonism at Oxford, the 2014 meeting of the International 
Society for Utilitarian Studies in Yokohama, and at SUNY Brock-
port in 2016. Thanks to all those present on these occasions for 
their helpful comments. Unfortunately I have by now forgotten 
many of these comments and who said them, but I am pretty sure 
I had helpful feedback from at least some of the following people: 
Matt Adler, Gustaf Arrhenius, Gordon Barnes, Krister Bykvist, 
Richard Chappell, Dale Dorsey, Fred Feldman, Hilary Greaves, Liz 
Harman, Chris Heathwood, Nils Holtug, Eden Lin, Connie Rosati, 
and David Sobel. 
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are constant throughout people’s lives, whereas in society B, on any 
given day half the citizens are extremely well-off and the other half 
are miserable. We might think there is an important difference 
between these societies, since in A there is constant equality where-
as in B there is constant inequality (though over time it evens out). 
Relatedly, some think that there is such a thing as justice within a 
life—that there is a kind of injustice or objectionable inequality in a 
situation where an individual is better off at one time than another.2  
The second concerns the alleged effect of improvement on life-
time well-being. Some think that it is better to have an improving 
life than a declining one.3 Imagine two lives that are mirror images 
of one another: one starts poorly and ends very well, the other 
starts very well and ends poorly. According to defenders of this 
view, it is better to have the first sort of life than the second. 
Whether this view is true or not, in order even to understand the 
view, we must be employing the notion of well-being at a time. 
The third concerns harm. There are many views about what 
makes an event harmful to someone; one view is the “historical 
worsening” view, which states that one is harmed if one is made 
worse off than one was before.4 The historical worsening view 
presupposes that there is such a thing as well-being at a time. 
On some views about well-being, temporal well-being is a sim-
ple matter. For example, according to hedonism, what is good for 
someone is pleasure. What makes it the case that things are going 
well at a time for someone, then, is just that the person is getting 
pleasure at that time. On other views it is less clear what to say 
about temporal well-being. In particular, desire-based views of 
well-being seem to face a challenge in accounting for temporal 
well-being. 
According to a desire fulfillment view of well-being, what is 
good for someone is getting what she wants, while what is bad for 
someone is failing to get what she wants. A primary motivation for 
this view is what has been called the “resonance constraint.”5 
According to this constraint, nothing can be good for someone 
unless it “resonates” with that person—that is, the person must 
2 McKerlie 1989 
3 Chisholm 1986, 71; Velleman 1991; Glasgow 2013 
4 Rabenberg 2015 
5 Railton 2002, 47; Dorsey 2012, 275. 
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find the thing attractive or good or desirable in some way. The 
good for a person cannot leave her cold. 
The crucial thing to note about desire fulfillment views is that 
there are two things that are responsible for things going well for 
someone: the person having a desire for something to be the case, 
and that thing actually being the case. The desire and its object 
might, and often do, occur at different times. This is what gives rise 
to the difficulties in determining when a desire fulfillment benefits 
someone.6 
Suppose S desires that P. Suppose the desire happens at time 
t1, and P obtains at time t2. When, if ever, is S benefited by this? 
There are four answers that have been defended: 
 
at t2 only (the “time of object” view); 
at t1 only (the “time of desire” view); 
at only whichever of t1 or t2 is later (the “later time” view); 
at t1 *and* t2, if t1=t2; otherwise at no time (the “time of both” 
view). 
 
I will argue that the last of these, the “time of both” view, is the 
most plausible, but that there is yet another view that has not been 
discussed—I’ll call it the “later desire” view—that is nearly as 
plausible as the time of both view. But I will also raise problems 
for the time of both view and the later desire view. 
2. The Time of Object View 
The time of object view has some initial plausibility. It would be 
natural to think that the time things go well is at the time you get the 
thing you were wanting (Baber 2010). Nevertheless this view can be 
eliminated quickly. It would seem strange to say that things are 
going well for us at times before we are born or after we are dead; 
but our desires often take as objects states that obtain only after we 
dead, and occasionally take as objects states that obtained before 
we were born. For example, if I now want it to be the case that 
humans visit Mars, and they do so in the year 2400, the time of 
object view entails that things are going well for me in 2400, even 
6 See Bradley 2009 Ch. 1, where I explain some of these difficulties. 
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if I died centuries earlier.7 Or if I now desire that my ancestors did 
not commit atrocities, but they did commit atrocities 400 years ago, 
the time of object view entails that things were going badly for me 
400 years ago. This is absurd. Hence it is difficult to find anyone 
who endorses the time of object view. 
Even in cases where the person exists at the time the object of 
her desire obtains, the time of object view seems unintuitive. If I 
am asked how things are going for me now, it makes little sense to 
say “it’s going great. I am now getting things I used to want but no 
longer care about.”  As Dale Dorsey points out, this would violate 
the resonance constraint on well-being, which is supposed to be 
the main part of the attraction of desire-based views of well-being 
in the first place (Dorsey 2012, 275; Dorsey 2013, 156). 
3. The Time of Desire View 
The time of desire view has recently been defended by Dorsey and 
Donald Bruckner. Bruckner gives a somewhat complicated argu-
ment for the view (Bruckner 2013). The argument turns on the 
thought that when someone desires something, and the thing 
desired takes some period of time to happen, the person may be 
getting what she wants at times during that period, even though 
whether she is getting what she wants at one of those times de-
pends on what happens at later times. To illustrate, Bruckner gives 
us the following pair of cases (Bruckner 2013, 17). (1) Lenny desires 
to have a long romantic kiss from t0-t12. He has this desire from 
t0-t12. He gets the kiss that lasts from t0-t12. (2) Same case, but 
the kiss is interrupted at t5. In the first case, according to Bruckner, 
Lenny is getting what he wants throughout t0-t12. This is good for 
Lenny from t0-t12. But in the second case, he is never getting what 
he wants, not even from t0-t5, given that the kiss will be inter-
rupted; so nothing good happens for Lenny at all. He desires a long 
kiss. So what happens after t5 affects how things go for Lenny from 
t0-t5, because in the first case he is getting what he wants at those 
times and in the second he isn’t. 
It is important to distinguish between the claim that Lenny is 
getting what he wants at that time, and the claim that he gets what he 
7 Baber seems to accept this conclusion: “If my paper is accepted 
for publication after my death, the posthumous time of the 
decision is the moment at which I benefit”(Baber 2010, 264). 
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wants at that time. Lenny is getting what he wants at t3, but does 
not get what he wants at t3; he only gets what he wants at the end 
of the period, or maybe at the whole period (Bruckner 2013, 20). 
According to Bruckner, we should say that things are going well 
for someone at the time he is getting what he wants, even if he has 
not yet got what he wants.8 
So far, Bruckner has not given a reason to accept the time of 
desire view. After all, the time of object view also entails that things 
are going well for Lenny throughout t0-t12. So Bruckner now asks 
us to consider two more examples (Bruckner 2013, 21-22). (3) 
Olivia desires, all day, to work all day, and she does. (4) Paul desires, 
all day, to submit a paper by 6pm, and he does. Given what has 
already been said about Lenny, it seems Olivia benefits in the 
morning, since she desires in the morning to be working all day, 
and in virtue of working all day (which is an ongoing process that 
includes things that happen in the morning and after the morning), 
she is getting what she wants in the morning. According to Bruck-
ner, we should treat Paul the same way. We should say that he is 
benefiting in the morning. The object of his desire does not obtain 
at all until the afternoon, so he is not yet getting what he wants in 
the morning; but since, given the Lenny case, how things are going 
for someone at one time can be affected by what happens at some 
later time, there seems no reason to say that Paul is not being 
benefited in the morning. 
 But on the contrary, there is in fact a reason not to say that 
he is benefited in the morning: in the morning, Paul is not yet get-
ting anything he wants. This seems like an important difference 
between Olivia and Paul. Olivia is getting what she wants in the 
morning, and Paul isn’t. The most we can say about Paul is that in 
the morning, he is going to get what he wants later. Why think he is 
better off in the morning in virtue of that fact obtaining? After all, 
it is true of all times before he gets what he wants that he is later going to 
get what he wants. Bruckner offers the following in defense of the 
claim that Paul benefits in the morning:  
8 I believe that focusing on the time one is getting what one wants 
will lead to strange results in many cases, implying that it is better 
to desire things that take a long time to happen. But I will not 
pursue this here. 
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If we were not to admit that his success in the early 
evening makes it that he fared well in the morning, 
then we would be severely limited in what we could 
say about how he fared in the morning. As far as 
his morning desire to submit his paper by 6 p.m. 
goes, the later satisfaction or frustration of that 
desire would not affect his welfare either positively 
or negatively. Indeed, its satisfaction or frustration 
could not possibly affect his welfare either posi-
tively or negatively. (Bruckner 2013, 22-3) 
Reading Bruckner’s argument uncharitably, we might think he is 
changing the subject mid-argument. We need to distinguish the 
question of whether Paul benefits from the question of whether he 
benefits in the morning. It is perfectly consistent to say both that Paul 
benefits from his submitting the paper and that he does not benefit 
in the morning. It is even possible to say that Paul benefits from 
submitting the paper without benefiting at any time. A more 
charitable reading would interpret him as referring to temporal 
well-being throughout the argument: Paul certainly benefits in the 
morning, and the only way to get this result is by adopting the time 
of desire view. But why think Paul benefits in the morning? It is 
not at all intuitive to say that he does. After all, he is not yet getting 
anything he wants! 
Dorsey’s argument for the time of desire view is based on the 
resonance constraint (Dorsey 2013, 159). We saw that the time of 
object view fails, in part, because it does not respect the resonance 
constraint: if I get something that I used to desire but no longer do, 
the time of object view entails that this is good for me now even 
though the thing is not resonating with me now. According to the 
time of desire view, something benefits me at a time only if I am 
desiring it at that time—so any time things are going well for me, 
something is resonating with me. The relevant resonance con-
straint is time-relative: something benefits someone at a time only 
if it resonates with her at that time. 
The time of desire view also has an advantage over the time of 
object view: it does not entail that things can go well or badly for 
someone at a time before or after she has come into existence. 
Since you must exist to have a desire, when you go out of existence 
you stop having temporal well-being. 
However, the time of desire view is just as unintuitive as the 
time of object view. When you are desiring something and have 
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not yet got it, or are not get getting it, things are not yet going well 
for you. Nothing good is happening for you yet! Consider a young 
girl who wants to become an astronaut, and then as an adult does 
become an astronaut. Would anyone say that this girl had a 
wonderful childhood because she had this desire that ended up 
being satisfied years later? Or if she ended up not becoming an 
astronaut, would anyone say this made her childhood go poorly?9 
The desire fulfillment theorist might be willing to put up with 
this counterintuitive result if it were the only way to hold on to the 
time-relative resonance constraint. But in fact what these cases 
seem to show is that an even more restrictive resonance constraint 
is plausible. In order for something to go well for someone at a 
time, it must not only resonate with the person at that time—it 
must also obtain at that time.10 The time of desire view violates this 
resonance constraint. The only view that is compatible with this 
resonance constraint is the time of both view. But before we get to 
that view, there is one more view to consider. 
4. The Later Time View 
Eden Lin suggests that it is a mistake to identify either the time of 
the desire or the time of the object as the time at which someone 
is benefited by a desire fulfillment. Rather, he thinks it is sometimes 
one and sometimes the other- hence he calls the view “asym-
metrism” (Lin forthcoming). But more specifically he thinks that 
the relevant time is whichever of the two times is later, so I will call 
it the “later time” view. For example, when a girl desires to become 
an astronaut and then becomes one as an adult, this benefits her 
9 I think the moral of such cases is that how well things are going 
for you at a time is determined entirely by what is happening at that 
time (Bradley 2009; see Dorsey 2013, 166-70 for criticism). But 
here I do not defend that general principle, only the implausibility 
of saying that events in adulthood retroactively make your 
childhood better or worse. 
10 See Lin forthcoming, 19. Lin introduces this principle not to 
endorse it, but to defend his own view from the accusation that it 
violates the weaker resonance constraint—the thought being that 
if both the time of desire view and the later time view violate some 
resonance constraint or other, there is no significant reason to 
prefer the time of desire view to the later time view. 
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when she is an adult, not when she is a child, according to the later 
time view. On the other hand, suppose I now desire not to have 
made a fool of myself at the party last night, and in fact I didn’t 
make a fool of myself. According to the later time view, this bene-
fits me now, not last night. Again, this seems like the better thing 
to say. The underlying thought is that one starts to benefit from a 
satisfaction only when both parts of it have happened (Lin forth-
coming, 8). Nothing good has happened until both the desire and 
its object have happened; so you can’t benefit until both have hap-
pened. 
But this is not quite enough. As Lin notes, the later time view 
will share some of the absurd consequences of the time of object 
view: my desire that people colonize Mars will make me better off 
when people colonize Mars even if I am long dead by then. To 
avoid this result Lin simply adds a clause: you benefit only when 
both the desire and its object have obtained, and you exist (Lin forth-
coming, 20). Of course, adding such a clause is also open to the 
defender of the time of object view. So we might wonder whether 
the later time view is very much better than the time of object view. 
But perhaps it is, since it does seem to get a better result in the case 
where I desire not to have made a fool of myself last night. 
Nevertheless the later time view should be rejected. Like the 
time of object view, it violates the resonance constraint. In cases 
where the object of your desire obtains long after you have stopped 
desiring that thing (but you still exist), the later time view entails 
that things are going well for you when that thing obtains. If we are 
motivated by resonance constraints on well-being we should find 
this unacceptable. 
We might also wonder about the ad hoc nature of the existence 
requirement. After all, if we accept the later time view, we are 
committed to saying that you need not desire something at a time 
in order to be benefited then. Why, then, do you need to exist at 
all? Consider this case. You desire from t1 to t2 that rhinos exist. 
At t2, a rhino scares away your dog and you stop caring about 
whether rhinos exist; and for all you know, they don’t. At t3 (>t2) 
you die not knowing or caring whether there are rhinos. According 
to the later time view you are benefited from t2-t3 as long as rhinos 
exist then, but not after t3. But why treat these times differently? 
The only reason to do so is to avoid the absurd result that the dead 
can be well off. The motivation does not flow from anything 
internal to the later time view or from the desire fulfillment view 
more generally. After all, on these views your welfare is determined 
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by things happening wholly outside you. So there is nothing in 
these views that should lead us to think there would be a problem 
with being benefited at times when you do not exist. 
5. The Time of Both View 
As mentioned above, the only view that respects the strong but 
plausible time-relative resonance constraint is the time of both 
view. On this view, you are benefited at a time only if you have a 
desire at that time and its object is obtaining at that time. This view 
avoids the result that you can be benefited or harmed at times 
before or after you exist (because you have no desires at those 
times). It avoids the result that you are benefited now by satisfying 
your long-extinct childhood desires, and also avoids the result that 
you retroactively benefit or harm your childhood self by satisfying 
or frustrating your childhood desires. These advantages are so 
significant that the desire fulfillment theorist should adopt the time 
of both view. 
Dorsey wonders why we should care whether a desire and its 
object obtain at the same time (Dorsey 2013, 157-58). After all, we 
do not care whether they obtain in the same place. A desire for 
something to happen far away can benefit you, according to a 
desire fulfillment theorist, even if you don’t know that it happens. 
Why not also say that a desire for something at a distant time can 
benefit you? Isn’t it arbitrary to say that spatial distance is irrelevant 
but temporal distance is crucial? The answer is no. If I want to 
know how things are going for me now, it does not seem arbitrary 
to confine my attention to what things relevant to my well-being 
are happening now.  Temporal distance matters for temporal well-
being. If we had a notion of spatial well-being, spatial distance 
would matter to it; but we don’t, it seems. (We don’t ever say “I am 
well-off here” or “my desire is satisfied here,” or “I am better off 
here than there,” unless perhaps when talking about a body part.) 
In previous work I have argued that, given how many of our 
desires are forward-looking, the time of both view entails that there 
isn’t as much temporal well-being as we intuitively think there 
ought to be (Bradley 2009, 23). Dorsey agrees with this point 
(Dorsey 2013, 157). But at least concerning desire-based views, I 
am no longer sure whether this is an objection or merely a mildly 
interesting implication of the view. Maybe there just isn’t all that 
much well-being taking place at moments or small durations of 
time; maybe you typically need a longer stretch of time to get some 
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well-being. In a case where someone has lots of satisfied desires in 
their life, and hence (on the desire-fulfillment view) a lot of well-
being, it does not seem ideal to have to say that things are not going 
well for the person at very many moments in their life. We would 
expect there to be many good moments in a good life. The time of 
both view entails that, in principle, there could be an excellent life 
that had no good moments in it. This result could be avoided, 
however, by saying that in cases where a desire and its object do 
not overlap in time, not only is there no momentary well-being, there 
is no well-being at all; if you desire something at one time, and it 
happens at another time after you have stopped desiring it, nothing 
good at all has happened (Heathwood 2005). 
There is another “asymmetrical” view that is more plausible 
than Lin’s later time view, and might be as plausible as the time of 
both view. It is, in a way, intermediate between these views. On 
this view, which we could call the “later desire” view, things are 
going well for you at a time if at that time you have a desire about 
the present or past that is fulfilled—but not if it is about the future. 
This view has some advantages over other views. Concerning the 
person who desires not to have made a fool of herself last night, 
the later desire view entails that she is better off at the time of the 
desire. It also entails that you do not benefit from the existence of 
rhinos at any time after you have stopped desiring their existence, 
which seems like the right result. Unlike the later time view, it does 
not require us to adopt an ad hoc existence requirement. And, like 
the time of desire view, it is compatible with a weak resonance 
constraint, since nothing is going well for you at a time unless you 
have a desire at that time. (It is not compatible with the stronger 
resonance constraint.) 
However, consider the following example. You want the 
Yankees to win the World Series, and they do win the world series 
in October. But you are stranded in Antarctica and you don’t even 
know what month it is. If it is September, they haven’t won the 
World Series yet, but they will next month. If it is November, they 
won the World Series last month. On the later desire view, you 
benefit now if it is now November, but not if it is now September. 
Why should these cases be treated differently? 
Other views will share this problem, including the time of both 
view. Simply consider the possibility that it is now October, and 
the Yankees are now winning the world series as you desire. On 
the time of both view, you benefit now if it is now October, but 
not if it is now September or November. This seems equally wrong. 
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Intuitively, whether you now benefit in such cases should not be 
determined by what month it now is. 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that the most plausible desire-based view of temporal 
well-being is the time of object view, or perhaps the later desire 
view. These views have important advantages over the time of 
desire view and the later time view; but we just saw that they also 
get strange results in certain cases where the object of the desire 
obtains at some faraway place. This might lead us back to the time 
of desire view, since on the time of desire view it does not matter 
whether the object obtains before or after the desire—either way, 
there is temporal well-being at the time the desire occurs. But we 
have already seen that the time of desire view is unacceptable. 
I think what these cases really show is the strong attractiveness 
of saying that how well things are going for me now is determined 
wholly by my current mental states, and the deep unattractiveness 
of views (such as desire fulfillment views) according to which my 
well-being is determined by events taking place far away. More 
generally, I think they show that the kind of resonance that is 
important for well-being is not desire, but enjoyment. Things are not 
going well for you at a time unless something is resonating with 
you at that time—but more specifically, you must be enjoying 
yourself at that time. If you are enjoying the prospect of the Yan-
kees winning, things are going well for you; if you merely want 
them to win, but take no pleasure in the prospect, things are not 
going well for you. If you now are pleased that you didn’t make a 
fool of yourself last night, that is good for you now. If you are now 
enjoying the prospect that people will colonize Mars in 2400, that 
is good for you now too. If you aren’t enjoying anything at all now, 
things aren’t going well for you now, no matter what you want. To 
establish this, however, would take much more argument. For now, 
I conclude merely that if you wish to defend a desire fulfillment 
view of well-being, you should adopt the time of both view or the 
later desire view. 
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